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THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE COIN: STATE APPROACHES IN
REGULATING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
By: Zachary Miller

I.

INTRODUCTION

Virtual currencies—often referred to as cryptocurrencies, bitcoins,
and tokens—are becoming a mainstay in America’s economy. Virtual
currency began its rise on October 31, 2008, the day mystery man
“Satoshi Nakamoto” published the infamous Bitcoin white paper, which
described the virtual currency platform and underlying blockchain
technology.1 Bitcoin was given monetary value for the first time in 2010
when an individual purchased pizza in exchange for Bitcoin.2 In just ten
years, Bitcoin has achieved a market capitalization in excess of
$724,000,000,000 dollars.3
Since 2016, Bitcoin and other alternative coins—known as “alt
coins”—have emerged from the fringes of the internet and are freely
traded amongst the retail and institutional investing communities.4
Bitcoin futures are also traded on prominent derivatives marketplaces
such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and Bitcoin is even
available for purchase from specialized ATMs and notable money
transmitter services such as the Cash app.5
1 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer‐to‐Peer Electronic Cash System (Oct. 31, 2008),
nakamotoinstitute.org/bitcoin/.
2 Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should
Read,
FORBES
(Dec.
6,
2017,
12:28
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-history-of-bitcoinand-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#5cb9d9b83f27.
3 Today’s Cryptocurrency Prices by Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
4 See Eric Rosenberg, History of Cryptocurrency, the balance (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.thebalance.com/history-of-cryptocurrency-5119511
5 Bitcoin
futures
and
options,
CME
GROUP,
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/bitcoin-futures.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2021);
see also Benjamin Pirus, CME Bitcoin Futures Now Average $370 Million In Trading Per
Day,
FORBES
(Aug.
28,
2019,
8:01
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminpirus/2019/08/28/cme-bitcoin-futuresnow-average-370-million-in-trading-per-day/#4cbdfe2067ea (Bitcoin Futures); Rick
D., Continued Spread of Bitcoin ATMs Normalizing Cryptocurrency Around the World,
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Virtual currencies are growing more popular in consumer and
peer-to-peer business transactions.
Overstock.com, PayPal, and
Microsoft all began to accept Bitcoin as a form of payment in 2014.6
Even the Dallas Mavericks, a professional basketball team owned by
billionaire Mark Cuban, accept Bitcoin as a method of payment for
tickets and merchandise.7
Blockchain, the peer-to-peer distributed network technology
underlying all Bitcoin transactions, has also amplified the popularity of
virtual currencies due to its utility for business and administrative
functions.8 For example, many of the largest corporations in the world
are either developing or acquiring blockchain based technologies.9
Additionally, several state and local governments have acknowledged
blockchain’s utility in record keeping and other ministerial functions;
these localities are taking action to formalize, implement, or otherwise
research blockchain technology.10 Notwithstanding, only a few states
have taken legislative initiative by enacting legislation or promulgating

BEINCRYPTO (Jan. 2, 2020), https://beincrypto.com/continued-spread-of-bitcoin-atmsnormalizing-cryptocurrency-around-the-world/ (Bitcoin ATMs); Cash App, My First
Bitcoin and the Legend of Satoshi Nakamoto, https://cash.app/bitcoin (last visited Mar.
20, 2021) (The Cash App).
6 Cade Metz, Overstock.com Becomes First Major Retailer to Accept Bitcoin
Worldwide,
WIRED
(Sept.
11,
2014,
9:20
AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/09/overstock-com-becomes-first-major-retaileraccept-bitcoin-worldwide/;
PAYPAL
PUBLIC
POLICY,
Blockchain,
https://publicpolicy.paypal-corp.com/issues/blockchain (last visited Mar. 20, 2021);
CNNMoney, Microsoft begins accepting Bitcoin, Harford Business Journal (Dec. 11. 2014),
https://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/microsoft-begins-acceptingbitcoin#:~:text=Microsoft%20is%20now%20accepting%20the,Microsoft’s%20payme
nt%20and%20billing%20policy.
7 Paige Vasquez, Dallas Mavericks Offer Special Merchandise Discounts for Bitcoin
Buyers, NBA (Dec. 22. 2020), mavs.com/bitcoin-buyers/.
8 According to IBM “[b]lockchain is a shared, immutable ledger that facilitates the
process of recording transactions and tracking assets in a business network.”8 IBM,
What is blockchain technology?, https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/what-is-blockchain
(last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
9 Michael del Castillo, Big Blockchain: The 50 Largest Public Companies Exploring
Blockchain,
FORBES
(July
3,
2018,
8:46
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/07/03/big-blockchain-the50-largest-public-companies-exploring-blockchain/#60cfc6752b5b (“[N]ot only are all
ten of the largest public companies in the world exploring blockchain, but at least 50 of
the biggest names on the [Forbes Global 2000] list have all made their own mark on
technology first inspired by bitcoin.”).
10 Heather Morton, Blockchain State Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 28, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-andcommerce/the-fundamentals-of-risk-management-and-insurance-viewed-throughthe-lens-of-emerging-technology-webinar.aspx.
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regulations specifically addressing virtual currencies, while others have
chosen to address blockchain technology alone.11
This comment will first discuss how the ambiguous and amorphous
nature of virtual currency leads to problems in defining, and in turn,
effectively regulating virtual currency. Part II will explore the federal
government’s approach to regulating the crypto space. This approach is
largely driven by an interest in combating money laundering, financing
of illicit criminal activity (mainly narcotics trafficking and terrorism
financing),12 and the enforcement of federal securities law.13 Ultimately,
federal virtual currency regulation is steeped in an enforcement
paradigm.14 In light of the federal approach, Part III will analyze the
regulatory approaches at the state level, which is largely driven by
competing consumer protection and economic assimilation and
advancement goals. Specifically, Part III provides a deeper analysis of
the regulatory schemes enacted in Wyoming, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii and Washington State. Part IV will seek to advocate for the
“crypto-friendly” approaches adopted by Wyoming and Colorado, while
highlighting the shortcomings and pitfalls of the more burdensome
money transmitter and surety bond requirements applied to virtual
currency businesses in Hawaii, Connecticut, and Washington.

PART II: SQUARE PEG, ROUND HOLE: DEFINING
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AS SECURITIES & FEDERAL
MONEY TRANSMITTER REQUIREMENTS
A. SECURITIES LITIGATION & VIRTUAL CURRENCY
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Strategic Hub for
Innovation and Financial Technology (“FinHub”) recently published an
analytical framework for entities considering an Initial Coin Offering
(“ICO”) to determine whether the given virtual currency or ICO falls
within the definition of a “security.”15 While this guidance is useful, it
does not supersede existing regulations or federal precedent
11

Id.
See generally Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2010);
Treas. Order 180-01 (Jul. 1, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-oftreasury/orders-directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx.
13 See generally SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1933); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1934).
14 See infra PART II.
15 U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM.: FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS
OF DIGITAL ASSETS (April 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investmentcontract-analysis-digital-assets#_edn1.
12
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surrounding issues of securities registration requirements for virtual
currencies.16
The Securities Act of 1933 (“the ‘33 Act”) and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”) collectively created The Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).17 Congress created the SEC and its
robust regulatory scheme to prevent financial institutions and publicly
traded companies from disseminating the kind of fraudulent and
misleading information that brought about the stock market crash in
1929.18 The ‘33 Act and the Exchange Act achieve their goals by
promulgating securities registration and reporting requirements for
issuing companies. Of central importance is the ‘33 Act’s definitional
criteria for what kinds of agreements, offerings, and business
arrangements would be considered an “investment contract,” and in
turn, a security.19
One of the seminal cases in securities litigation, SEC v. Howey Co.,20
enumerated a test to determine whether a given asset qualifies as an
investment contract subject to securities registration requirements: “a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money
[2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits solely [sic]
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”21 The Howey court
emphasized that the investment contract analysis embodies a flexible
interpretational approach “that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of
the money of others on the promise of profits.”22 Howey’s flexible
economic reality approach allows the test to serve as a vital tool in
rooting out dubious, and often stranger than fiction, offerings and
schemes.23
16 Id. at n.1 (“This framework represents the views of the Strategic Hub for
Innovation and Financial Technology . . . this framework does not replace or supersede
existing case law, legal requirements, or statements or guidance from the Commission
or Staff.”) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT”].
17 SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.; SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a et seq.; What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM.,
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
18 See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, HISTORY (Dec.
6, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/securities-and-exchangecommission.
19 15 U.S.C § 77b(a)(1) (2012). Among a host of categories, the term “security” is
defined as “any note, stock, bond, [or] investment contract . . .”
20 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
21 Id. at 298-99.
22 Id. at 299.
23 See, e.g., Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974) (involving
a scheme in which promotors agreed to purchase chinchilla offspring from investors at
above market prices and return profits after successful marketing in exchange for
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The history of financial fraud is as old as currency itself and, as
such, it is of little surprise that entrepreneurs and hackers alike have
seized the opportunity to capitalize on the public’s interest in virtual
currency by crafting fraudulent initial coin offerings, or alternatively, by
stealing investor’s funds through technological means.24 In light of the
rampant fraud in the virtual currency space, the federal government
cracked down on unregistered ICOs and related secondary offerings by
urging courts to apply Howey to all such offerings.25 It is important to
note the gravity of labeling a virtual currency offering as an investment
contract because such a finding triggers a myriad of federal and state
regulations in which compliance is, in many cases, prohibitively
expensive and arduous.26 For example, among a litany of required
financial disclosures, SEC Regulation S-X mandates the inclusion of
audited balance sheets going back two years, as well as audited income
statements for the previous three years.27
The Court in United States v. Zaslavskiy faced the threshold question
of whether virtual currency tokens are securities as defined by the
Securities Act. 28 Ultimately, the court applied the Howey test in
concluding that the virtual currency “tokens” and corresponding ICOs at

investors’ commitment to raise chinchillas); see also, Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th
Cir. 1979) (involving an earthworm breeding investment scheme).
24 See Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs Conducted in 2017 Were
Scams, COIN TELEGRAPH (Jul. 13, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-studysays-80-percent-of-icos-conducted-in-2017-were-scams; see also Brian Barrett, Hack
Brief: Hackers Stole $40 Million from Binance Cryptocurrency Exchange, WIRED (May 8,
2019,1:20
PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/hack-binance-cryptocurrencyexchange/.
25 Because the SEC considers ICOs as securities, the majority of cases brought
against issuers center around violations of § 77f. See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM.:
FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (April 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digitalassets#_edn1.; 15 U.S.C. § 77f requires the registration of publicly offered securities
through the filing of a signed registration statement[.]”
26 See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, What is a Registration Statement?
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/registrationstatement; see also U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Filing Review Process (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm.
27 See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1– 210.12. Note that disclosures differ for “emerging
growth companies” which a majority of virtual currency entities would qualify as. While
this comment will not explore the details of the securities registration process, such
information is included for the sole purpose of emphasizing the cost and difficulty of
registration.
28 United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR647(RJD), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156574, at
*13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018).
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issue could satisfy the definition of securities.29 At issue in Zaslavskiy
was whether the defendant “made materially false and fraudulent
representations and omissions” when courting investors for two virtual
currency entities: REcoin Group Foundation, LLC (“Recoin”) and DRC
World, Inc. (“Diamond”).30 REcoin was geared towards creating smart
contracts purportedly “backed by domestic and international real estate
investments[.]”31 Diamond sought to create a virtual currency backed
by “real world assets” specifically, diamonds.32 Both vehicles promised
substantial returns on investment in exchange for participation in
either, or both, ICOs.33 The Defendant’s failure to dismiss the charges
against him by advancing a vagueness as applied challenge illustrates
the fact-intensive inquiry necessitated by Howey, especially when
applied to asset classes that have been in existence for less than twenty
years. 34
This contention is further supported by another recent case
concerning alleged violations of federal securities law by the founder of
a virtual currency exchange. The Court in SEC v. Blockvest, LLC35 denied
the SEC’s motion for preliminary injunction because in the initial stages
of litigation, it was not clear whether the virtual coins at issue satisfied
the test under Howey.36 Here, the Defendant attempted to create a
virtual currency exchange for the sale of a particular digital asset
referred to as “BLVs” through a multi-stage sale culminating with a 100
million dollar ICO launch.37 The decision turned on whether the future
interest in the virtual currency exchange held by thirty-two-test
investors constituted a reasonable expectation of profits, as required
under the second-prong of Howey.38 As further evidenced in Blockvest,
29 Id. at *23 (denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that, “a
reasonable jur[or] [could] find that the investment opportunities described satisfy the
Howey, [sic] test, and therefore meet the definition of ‘security’”).
30 Id. at *1.
31 Id. at *3-4.
32 Id. at *5.
33 Id. at *3-6. According to the REcoin white paper, investors could “convert their
savings into real estate-backed currency for the potential of high returns to protect their
earnings from inflation[.]” The Defendant also projected “a minimum growth of 10%15% per year” on Diamond investments.
34 See Zaslavskiy, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156574 at *2.
35 SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No.18-CV-2287-GPB (BLM) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200773,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018).
36 Id. at *20-21 (finding that disputed issues of fact could not lead the Court to “make
a determination whether the test BLV tokens were ‘securities’ under the first prong of
Howey[,]” and that the SEC did not show that, “the 32 test investors had an ‘expectation
of profits.’”)
37 Id. at *4.
38 Id. at *20.
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minor factual details can make Howey analysis convoluted, for example
whether an offering to test-investors constitutes a public offering or
whether those investors had a reasonable expectation of profit. These
details all but guarantee an inquiry deeper than what is required at the
initial pleading stages of litigation, and likely at the summary judgment
stage as well.
Ultimately, these cases demonstrate how securities litigation, as
applied to virtual currencies and ICOs, are likely to produce voluminous
litigation in the foreseeable future based on the adopted broad readings
of federal securities laws, coupled with the fact-intensive inquiry
necessitated by Howey. The Federal Government’s efforts in defining
virtual currencies has also been frustrated by the divergent approaches
of the different regulatory agencies, due in large part to each agency’s
concerns in their respective areas of responsibility.39 Notwithstanding,
efforts to coherently define virtual currencies in one box is akin to the
adage of putting a square peg in a round hole—one may eventually
hammer the peg through the hole, but there will always be pushback
and difficulty in doing so.
B. FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN) MSB
REQUIREMENTS
In 1990, Congress passed 31 U.S.C. § 310, in turn creating a new
bureau within the United States Treasury: the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).40 This specialized bureau was tasked
with protecting the American financial infrastructure by assisting
federal, state, and international law enforcement by enforcing
important anti-money laundering provisions under the Bank Secrecy
Act (BSA).41 FinCEN’s prominence increased after 9/11 revealing the
prevalence of the illicit financing of terrorism activities. Consequently,
the PATRIOT Act empowered FinCEN to pivot into a greater
enforcement role, rather than an informational and analytical resource
39 Compare U.S. TREAS., FIN. CRIMES ENF’T. NETWORK, FIN-2019-G001, APPLICATION OF
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES 22 (May 9, 2019), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/201905/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf (discussing application of
Bank Secrecy Act regulations to virtual currency business models); and FRAMEWORK FOR
“INVESTMENT CONTRACT”, supra note 15 (discussing potential application of federal
securities law registration requirements for companies considering Initial Coin
Offerings (ICOs).
40 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2010); see also Treas.
Order 180-01 (Jul. 1, 2014).
41 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332 (2001); see also FIN. CRIMES ENF’R. NET., Law Enforcement
Overview https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement-overview (last visited
March 12, 2021).
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for other law enforcement entities.42 FinCEN is responsible for ensuring
Money Service Businesses (MSBs) comply with registration and
reporting requirements under the BSA.43 The Treasury Secretary has
the power to order registered money transmitters to furnish their books
and records, as well as the power to promulgate anti-money laundering
compliance mechanisms; these powers provide an important incentive
for MSBs to comply with FinCEN’s mandates in this area.44
Since 2011, FinCEN has taken a leading role in asserting itself into
the cryptocurrency space by promulgating regulations under the BSA to
further clarify the kinds of virtual currency entities falling underneath
the Money Services Business criteria.45 Even without explicitly
mentioning virtual currencies by name, the catch-all language
effectively stretched the definition of MSBs to include virtual currency
businesses by stating, “‘money transmission services’ means the
acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for
currency[.]”46 The “or other value” language bears significance because
the federal government’s position on what is considered virtual
currency depends largely on which regulatory agency is being asked to
define it.47 Because broad catch-all definitions seldom provide clarity,
FinCEN has opted to continually provide guidance on how existing
regulations apply to virtual currency business models.48

42 See generally, §§ 5311-5332; USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107–56, §§ 311362 (Oct. 26, 2001).
43 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) (2001) (“The term ‘money transmitting business’
means any business . . . which [] provides check cashing, currency exchange, or money
transmitting or remittance services, or issues or redeems money orders, travelers’
checks, and other similar instruments, . . . transmission of funds, including any person
who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system.”).
44 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2014).
45 See Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to
Money Service Businesses, 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010, 1021, 1022 (2014).
46 See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., INTERNAL REV. SER., IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency is
Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions
Apply, (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-virtual-currency-guidance;
but see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McDonnell, 287 F.Supp.3d 213,
228 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that “[v]irtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a
commodity [because] [v]irtual currencies are ‘goods’ exchanged in a market for a
uniform quality or value.”); and see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N., Statement on
Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentiallyunlawful-online-platforms-trading (“A number of [virtual currency] platforms provide
a mechanism for trading assets that meet the definition of a ‘security’ under federal
securities laws.”).
48 See generally U.S. TREAS., supra note 39.
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Generally, the federal approach to virtual currency regulation is
primarily motivated by anti-money laundering, anti-fraud, and general
compliance with a given agency’s regulatory scheme. As the federal
government controls the dollar, it has little incentive to regulate virtual
currencies in a manner that would foster growth and allow for greater
assimilation into the economy. Doing so could threaten the dollar’s
hegemony. The same set of motivations, however, cannot be attributed
to the states.

PART III: STATE REGULATORY EFFORTS
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
The federal government and the states have distinct interests in
regulating virtual currencies. While the federal government’s focus is
centered on enforcing existing securities laws49 and anti-money
laundering laws,50 the states are more interested in consumer
protection.51 For example, “Operation Cryptosweep” is a task force
consisting of state-level law enforcement and securities regulators that
are members of the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA).52 Operation Cryptosweep “has resulted in more
than 330 inquiries and investigations and at least 85 enforcement
actions related to ICOs or cryptocurrency investment products.”53 As
virtual currencies have increased in popularity, so have state
governments’ interest in facilitating the implementation of these
technologies into their business communities, counties, and
municipalities. Wyoming is regarded as the chief innovator in virtual
currency legislation.54 Recently, states such as Colorado have entered
the fray by passing legislation like the Digital Token Act in early 2019.55
49 See SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78a.
50 FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2010); see also Treas.
Order 180-01 (Oct. 21, 2002).
51 NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOC., State and Provincial Securities
Regulators Conduct Coordinated International Crypto Crackdown, (May 21, 2018),
https://www.nasaa.org/45121/state-and-provincial-securities-regulators-conductcoordinated-international-crypto-crackdown-2/ (“A critical component of ‘Operation
Cryptosweep’ is raising public awareness of the risks associated with ICOs and
cryptocurrency-related investment products.”).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming,
WIRED (June 13, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/newest-havencryptocurrency-companies-wyoming/.
55 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-308.7 (West 2019).
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Notwithstanding these innovative states, the number of
jurisdictions passing legislation specifically addressing virtual currency
is scant. Instead, most states have opted to either exempt such
businesses from securities registration requirements,56 revise their
Money Transmitter Laws (MTLs) to include virtual currency (VC)
entities (similar to FinCEN’s approach),57 provide guidance from local
regulatory agencies,58 or refrain from action altogether.59 A recent trend
has developed where an increasing number of state regulators and
legislatures opt to impose Money Transmitter registration
requirements on VC entities.60 It is important to discuss the
consequences of this trend as state MTLs can be particularly
burdensome for VC entities.
B. THE BURDENS OF STATE MONEY TRANSMITTER REQUIREMENTS
A few states have chosen to exempt Virtual Currency Exchangers
from Money Transmitter licensing requirements by adopting a
definition of “money” that does not include virtual currencies.61 It
logically follows that a virtual currency transmitter would not qualify as
a “money” transmitter in the strict sense of the word. For example, as
early as 2014, the Kansas Banking Commission declared that existing
Money Transmitter Laws need not be amended to include virtual

56 See, e.g., Id. (providing a number of exemptions from securities regulation
requirements), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102 (2019) (divided assets into three
categories of intangible personal property, two of which are exempt from securities
registration requirements).
57 See, GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-690 (2016); ALA. CODE § 8-7A-2 (LexisNexis 2017).
58 See, e.g., KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM’N, Guidance Document MT 2014-01,
Regulatory Treatment of Virtual Currencies Under the Kansas Money Transmitter Act,
(June
6,
2014),
https://www.osbckansas.org/wpcontent/uploads/mt2014_01_virtual_currency.pdf; ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. AND PROF. REG.,
Digital
Currency
Regulatory
Guidance
(June
13,
2017),
https://www.idfpr.com/Forms/DFI/CCD/IDFPR%20%20Digital%20Currency%20Regulatory%20Guidance.pdf.
59 See Matthew E. Kohen & Justin S. Wales, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and
Blockchain
Technologies,
CARLTON
FIELDS
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/state-regulations-onvirtual-currency-and-blockchain-technologies (last updated August 29, 2019).
Examples of state’s remaining relatively inactive include Alaska, Mississippi, and South
Dakota.
60 See infra Part II, Sec. B.
61 See KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM’N, supra note 58.
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currencies because virtual currencies cannot be defined as money.62
Illinois’ financial regulatory arm followed suit later in 2017.63
In 2019, the Texas Department of Banking issued regulatory
guidance.64 That guidance stated that virtual currencies do not fall
within the state’s definition of currency because, “neither centralized
virtual currencies nor cryptocurrencies are coin and paper money
issued by the government of a country[.]”65 The exception to the rule
are exchanges of pegged virtual currencies, commonly referred to as
“stablecoins.”66 These kinds of virtual currencies are either pegged to
the value of sovereign currency, or other commodities holding
recognized intrinsic value such as stocks and bonds.67 Stablecoins,
while not as well known or popular as other virtual currencies, may
nonetheless provide an interesting foray for states in the coming years,
especially those that have legalized the sale of recreational cannabis.
Similar to cryptocurrencies, proceeds from the legal cannabis industry
have been shunned from the federal banking system.68 Consequently,
these businesses deal largely in cash transactions, which is inherently
difficult to track and tax.69 States have an incentive to efficiently
monitor and tax the recreational and medicinal cannabis industry, being
that it is a billion-dollar industry with an equally robust illicit market.
Acknowledging this problem, the California state assembly
introduced legislation in 2019 that would allow licensed Cannabis
entities to remit, “any city or county cannabis license tax amounts due
by payment using stablecoins[.]”70 Unfortunately, the California
62

See KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM’N, supra note 58.
See ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. AND PROF’L. REGUL., Digital Currency Regulatory Guidance (June
13,
2017),
https://www.idfpr.com/Forms/DFI/CCD/IDFPR%20%20Digital%20Currency%20Regulatory%20Guidance.pdf
64 TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, Supervisory Memorandum – 1037, Regulatory Treatment of
Virtual Currencies Under the Texas Money Services Act (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.dob.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/consumer-information/sm1037.pdf.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See generally, CB INSIGHTS, What are Stablecoins? (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/what-are-stablecoins/
(Research
report discussing stablecoins, virtual currencies which are pegged to the value of gold,
the US dollar, or other stable commodities or currencies. Many crypto investors hedge
their positions in more volatile virtual currencies with investments in stablecoins).
68 James J. Black & Marc-Alain Galeazzi, Cannabis Banking: Proceed with Caution, AM.
BAR
ASSOC.
(Feb.
06,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/02/cann
abis-banking/.
69 Id.
70 An act to add Section 34015.5 to the Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to
taxation. A.B. 3090, 2019-20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (introduced).
63
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legislature fell short in advancing the stablecoin cannabis tax remittance
bill. Nonetheless, such a bill demonstrates the unique crossroads of the
cannabis and virtual currency industries, and importantly, the
efficiencies such laws can create for local governments. For example, a
law similar to what was proposed in California would allow for greater
efficiency in tax collection for two reasons: (1) The bill pegs stablecoins
to the U.S. Dollar, making them easily convertible, and (2) transactions
on an immutable ledger are inherently easier to track, and in turn, tax
than traditional cash transactions.71 Thus, if such a bill were enacted in
a recreational cannabis state, it would increase tax revenue collection
with the added benefit of ensuring that licensed cannabis dealers and
cultivators are not diverting their funds and product into illicit
channels.72
Notwithstanding their potential utility burgeoning
popularity, stablecoins have yet to be embraced to attain the notoriety
of other virtual currencies.73
It is of great importance to highlight the differences between state
Money Transmitter Laws, and the federal requirements under the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) as the registration/licensing requirements for the
former are far more arduous than the latter.74 States require Money
Transmitters to apply for a license, a process which usually entails the
furnishing of detailed records including audited financial statements,
personal financial and background records of all control persons.75 The
licensing process under State MTLs are particularly burdensome for
applicants. Such applications require: (i) fees that may be prohibitively
expensive for entrepreneurs and small businesses; (ii) meticulous
financial record keeping standards; and (iii) the submission of
background checks of not only principal owners, but any key figures
employed by the applicant.76 Some states have a minimum net worth
71 See generally DELOITTE, Blockchain technology and its potential in taxes, p. 11-17
(Dec.
2017)
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/pl/Documents/Reports/pl_Blockc
hain-technology-and-its-potential-in-taxes-2017-EN.PDF
72 See Marie Huillet, US Politician Uses Crypto to Buy Cannabis for Tax Remittance
Demo, COIN TELEGRAPH (Sept. 12, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-politicianuses-crypto-to-buy-cannabis-for-tax-remittance-demo
73 CB INSIGHTS,
Why Stablecoins Are On the Rise, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/stablecoins-institutional-media-interest/.
74 Marco Santori, What is Money Transmission and Why Does it Matter?, COIN CENTER
(Apr. 7, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-money-transmission-and-whydoes-it-matter. The author notes that federal money transmitter regulations serve the
purpose of enforcing BSA’s money laundering provisions and only require “mere
registration,” while state money transmitter laws usually consist of a more
comprehensive licensing scheme.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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threshold, while others require an applicant to post a surety bond.77
Comparatively, under the Bank Secrecy Act, the registration process is
far more constrained and only requires applicants to file a “FinCEN
Form 107,” and the filing of a “list of agents” if the MSB enlists agents in
their regular course of business.78 Additionally, prospective MSBs must
submit supporting documentation such as, “an estimate of business
volume, [and] information regarding ownership or control[.]”79
Perhaps the biggest barrier to entry imposed by State MTLs, and
certainly the most consequential for the virtual currency industry, are
the permissible investment requirements adopted by a majority of
states.80 The purpose of these requirements is to protect creditors,
investors, and consumers by requiring MSBs to hold in trust permissible
investments, which, according to the Money Transmitter Regulators
Association (MTRA), “are low risk, liquid assets such as cash and high
rated investments required to be maintained in case an institution is
unable to meet its commitment or fails.”81 Essentially, under a
permissible investment regime, MSBs may only provide a service within
their means, especially when considering that most permissible
investment states require money transmitters to hold permissible
investments equal to their outstanding transmissions.82 If an MSB’s
liquid reserves do not equal its outstanding liabilities, then that MSB
would be in violation of that state’s Money Transmitters Laws.83

77 Compare TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §151.307(a) (West 2017) (minimum net worth of
$500,000 is required if a business operates through five or more locations. It has been
the Department’s policy that license holders operating through the Internet are
considered to be in more than five locations); with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.230.200(1)(b) (2017) (“A licensee transmitting virtual currencies must hold likekind virtual currencies of the same volume as that held by the licensee but which is
obligated to consumers . . . .”).
78 U.S. TREAS., FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, Money Services Business Registration Fact
Sheet, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCENfactsheet.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2021).
79 Id.
80 See generally Thomas Brown, 50‐State Survey: Money Transmitter Licensing
Requirements,
PAUL
HASTINGS
LLP
https://abnk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/abnk.assembly.ca.gov/files/50%20State%20Surv
ey%20-%20MTL%20Licensing%20Requirements(72986803_4).pdf (last visited Mar.
20, 2021) (Thirty-three United States jurisdictions, to include Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands, require the maintenance of permissible investments).
81 CONF. OF ST. BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTERS REGULATORS ASS’N, THE STATE OF
STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES REGULATION & SUPERVISION at 8 n.8 (May 2016),
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/201711/State%20of%20State%20MSB%20Regulation%20and%20Supervision%202.pdf.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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The imposition of Permissible Investment requirements upon
virtual currency exchanges negatively impacts individual businesses
and virtual currency industry as a whole. These effects have played out
in recent years: for example in Hawaii, the Division of Financial
Institutions (“DFI”) declared that “companies . . . offering to transmit
bitcoins . . . are doing so in violation of Hawaii’s money transmitter
laws.”84 As a result of this announcement, virtual currency businesses
operating or intending to operate in Hawaii are now required to submit
to the state’s money transmitter laws, and upon licensing approval, are
required to “possess permissible investments having an aggregate
market value . . . of not less than the aggregate amount of all outstanding
payment obligations.”85
DFI’s announcement immediately sent ripples through the virtual
currency industry.86 Coinbase, one of the world’s largest and most
prominent virtual currency purchasing and storage platforms,
announced that the consequences of DFI’s guidance were so untenable
that the company had no choice but to suspend operations in Hawaii.87
As a result, Hawaiian customers were left with scant alternatives
because, in the words of Coinbase’s Vice President and Deputy General
Counsel Juan Suarez, “we cannot recommend any service which meets
Coinbase’s security standards and which is licensed to operate in
Hawaii.”88
Soon after Coinbase’s dramatic response, Hawaiian
lawmakers introduced legislation exempting virtual currency
transmitters from the permissible investments and statutory trust
requirements, however, the legislation failed to make it to the
governor’s desk.89

84 HAWAII DP’T OF COMM. AND CONSUMER AFF., DIV. OF FIN. INST., News Release: State Warns
Consumers on Potential Bitcoin Issues (Feb. 26, 2014), http://cca.hawaii.gov/dfi/newsreleases/news-release-state-warns-consumers-on-potential-bitcoin-issues/.
85 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 489D-8(a) (LexisNexis 2017).
86 See Juan Suarez, How Bad Policy Harms Coinbase Customers in Hawaii, COINBASE
BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), https:// blog.coinbase.com/how-bad-policy-harms-coinbasecustomers-in-hawaii-ac9970d49b34; see also COINBASE, Coinbase accounts – Hawaii,
https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/managing-my-account/other/coinbaseaccounts-hawaii.html.
87 See Suarez, supra note 86; COINBASE, supra note 86.
88 COINBASE, supra note 86. At the time, Coinbase was licensed in thirty-eight United
States jurisdictions, to include a pending application in Hawaii. Suarez, supra note 86.
89 S.B. 1364, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019). The indirect ban on remained in
effect until August of 2020 when Hawaii launched two-year cryptocurrency trading
pilot. Andrew Gomes, Hawaii Allows Cryptocurrency Trading Pilot After Moratorium,
GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/budget-finance/hawaii-allowscryptocurrency-trading-pilot-after-moratorium.html.
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Hawaii sought to alter its money transmitter laws to enable the
burgeoning virtual currency industry to function within its border.90
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of states like Connecticut. In
2017, Connecticut’s legislature proposed amendments to its Money
Transmitter Laws seeking to define virtual currency, and subject
businesses dealing in such mediums of exchange to the state’s money
transmitter requirements.91 These amendments were eventually
codified into law in 2019.92 Connecticut’s money transmitter
amendments go a step further than other states applying such
requirements to virtual currency entities. Rather than furnishing
regulatory guidance applying existing laws to these entities,
Connecticut’s statute specifically addresses the transmission of virtual
currency.93
Connecticut’s mandate that a virtual currency transmitter “hold
virtual currency of the same type and amount owed or obligated to such
other person[]” is a unique choice of language that immensely impacts
the ability of virtual currency transmitters to legally conduct business
within their borders.94 Rather than matching outstanding obligations
with equivalent liquid assets, a virtual currency business in Connecticut
would be required instead to hold an equal amount of whichever type
of virtual currency or currencies it had transmitted. To illustrate this
point, assume a business transmitted a total of thirty units of a virtual
currency to various customers, such a business would now be required
to hold thirty units of the same virtual currency in trust.
This example understates the cost and complexity associated with
Connecticut’s permissible investment rule. For instance, the world’s
largest virtual currency exchange, “Binance” allows users to hold and
exchange numerous types of virtual currencies.95 In Connecticut,
Binance would then be required to match the outstanding value of each
and every currency it transmits. While Binance could meet such
requirements due to its sheer size and transaction volume, the same
cannot be said of the vast majority of virtual currency businesses and
exchanges that function more or less as small businesses from a balance
90

Id.
H.B. 7141, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017) (enacted).
92 2017 Conn. Acts 17-233 (Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-603 (West 2017).
93 2017 Conn. Acts 17-233 (Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-603 (West 2017).
94 See generally 2017 Conn. Acts 17-233 (Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-603
(West 2017) (emphasis added).
95 The Binance marketplace features hundreds of virtual currencies including the
more
recognizable
Bitcoin,
Ethereum,
and
Ripple.
BINANCE,
https://www.binance.com/en/markets (last visited Mar. 20, 2021); see also BINANCE,
About Binance, https://www.binance.com/en/about (last visited June 7, 2021).
91
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sheet perspective. This is a rule of immense consequence when taking
into consideration the costs associated with creating virtual currencies
such as: electricity consumption, computer hardware, and cooling
costs.96 Not to mention the cost of talent: aspiring virtual currency
businesses need to hire individuals with the requisite technical skills,
such as coding and advanced mathematics, in order to create or mine
digital currencies.97
Virtual currencies do not appear out of thin air and cannot simply
be printed like the U.S. dollar. Instead, virtual currencies are created
technologically through various methods, chief amongst these is mining:
the process of creating and verifying bitcoins, or other blockchain based
virtual currencies, through the use of high-powered computing
processes and complex mathematical formulas.98 The mining process
consumes large amounts of electricity because of the heavy reliance on
computing power.99 In fact, the amount of energy consumed by
worldwide bitcoin mining alone “is equivalent to the power uptake of
the country of the Czech Republic, with a population of 10.6 million[.]”100
Further, researchers have indicated that as of 2018, the cost (in terms
of electricity) of mining a single bitcoin in the United States was $4,758
dollars.101
Crypto mining companies operate globally seeking out countries
with low electricity costs and friendly regulatory environments.102
Miners prefer countries like Iceland due to the abundance of renewable
electricity production and colder climate.103 This may be problematic
96 Sean Williams, 3 Costs Cryptocurrency Miners Need to Know, and the 1 Wildcard
That Can Change Everything, MOTLEY FOOL (May 2, 2018, 9:21AM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/05/02/3-costs-cryptocurrency-miners-needto-know-and-the.aspx.
97 See Toshendra Kumar Sharma, 5 Skill Sets a Blockchain Developer Must Have,
BLOCKCHAIN COUNCIL, https://www.blockchain-council.org/blockchain/5-skill-sets-ablockchain-developer-must-have/ (last visited June 7, 2021).
98 David Easley, Maureen O’Hara, & Soumya Basu, From Mining to Markets: The
Evolution of Bitcoin Transaction Fees, 134 J. OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 91, 92 (2019).
99 Danny Bradbury, How Much Power It Takes to Create a Bitcoin, BALANCE (last
updated Apr. 22, 2020) https://www.thebalance.com/how-much-power-does-thebitcoin-network-use-391280 (based on the author’s calculations, “the bitcoin network
in 2020 consumes 120 gigawatts (GW) per second . . . [which] is the equivalent of 156
million horses . . . or 49,440 wind turbines . . . generating power at peak production per
second.”).
100 Aaron Hankin, Here’s How Much It Costs to Mine a Single Bitcoin in Your Country,
MARKETWATCH (May 11, 2018, 9:18AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/hereshow-much-it-costs-to-mine-a-single-bitcoin-in-your-country-2018-03-06.
101 Id.
102 Id. The United States is ranked 41 out of 50 surveyed countries.
103 Id. The colder climate of Iceland is an important factor for crypto miners because
it decreases the amount spent on artificial cooling methods.
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for virtual currency enterprises looking to outsource mining to avoid
the fees associated with electricity, hardware, and cooling while also
attempting to domicile operations in a single state. Outsourcing such
functions overseas may cause these companies to run afoul of federal
regulations.
Bearing these facts in mind, Connecticut’s requirement of holding
virtual currencies equal to the amount of outstanding obligations would
all but double the already high costs of developing and producing a
virtual currency.104 Virtual currencies do not circulate in the free
market in the same manner as traditional fiat currency. This is
especially true of companies engaged in the development and issuance
of utility tokens, a specific kind of virtual currency that may only be
exchanged for a specific good or service.105 Virtual currencies need to
be created, and their creation is an expensive and technically exhaustive
process. As such, imposing permissible investment obligations on these
entities is redundant and does little to protect consumers but instead
drives up transaction costs while driving businesses away from
Connecticut and towards more crypto-friendly jurisdictions.
C. THE BURDENS OF STATE SURETY BOND REQUIREMENTS
In 2017, Washington amended the Uniform Money Services Act to
bring virtual currencies within the purview of the state’s regulatory
regime.106 The legislature did so by (1) implementing surety bond
requirements for online currency exchangers,107 (2) indirectly defining
virtual currency,108 and (3) creating a multi-state licensing system for
virtual currency enterprises.109
Washington’s surety bond requirements function in a manner
similar to the permissible investment provisions discussed above. To
make matters worse, Washington still imposes requirements similar to
Connecticut law.110 The requisite surety bond needed for online
104

See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-603 (West 2017).
Utility
Token,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam‐
webster.com/dictionary/utility%20token, (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (“a digital token of
cryptocurrency that is issued in order to fund development of the cryptocurrency and
that can be later used to purchase a good or service offered by the issuer of the
cryptocurrency.”).
106 S.B. 5031, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.010
(West 2017).
107 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.055 (2017).
108 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.010(18) (defining “money transmission”).
109 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.033 (2017) (“Applicants may be required to
make application through a multistate licensing system as prescribed by the director.”).
110 Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.230.200(1)(b) (2017) (“A licensee
transmitting virtual currencies must hold like-kind virtual currencies of the same
105
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currency exchangers is calculated by “an amount based on the previous
year’s currency exchange dollar volume . . . [and] must be at least ten
thousand dollars, and not to exceed fifty thousand dollars.”111 The
director of the Department of Financial Institutions (DFI) also has the
discretion to increase the amount of the bond in conformity with the
size, performance, and nature of the business.112 The fees do not stop
there; the surety bond must also be maintained for the year following a
business’s exit from the state.113 This means that even if a virtual
currency enterprise ceases operations in its entirety, it still must
maintain its surety bond with the state for the following year to avoid
liability under Washington’s law.114
Washington takes an interesting approach to defining virtual
currencies that a number of states are likely to follow due to the state’s
Uniform Money Services Act and its creation of a multi-state licensing
system.115 The amendments to Washington’s money services act
expanded the definition of “money transmission” to include virtual
currency.116 Instead of saying what virtual currency actually is, the law
instead only goes as far as saying that virtual currencies have a value
equivalent to money.117 It is true that virtual currencies have an
equivalent value to money, but this is not the case for all virtual
currencies. Take, for example, the utility tokens briefly mentioned in
the above section. One could argue that a token issued in exchange for
a later promise of goods or services does not have an equivalent value
to money paid, but rather an equivalent value to the good or service
being offered. Such nuances are important and are not a stretch of the
imagination; one can see these kinds of arguments employed in the
earlier discussion of the Howey test’s application to virtual currency

volume as that held by the licensee but which is obligated to consumers . . . .”), with CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-603(b) (2017) (“Each licensee that engages in the business of
money transmission in this state by receiving, transmitting, storing or maintaining
custody or control of virtual currency on behalf of another person shall at all times hold
virtual currency of the same type and amount owed or obligated to such other person.”).
111 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.055(1).
112 § 19.230.055(6). (The surety bond may be increased “up to a maximum of one
million dollars based on the nature and volume of the business activities, the financial
health of the company[.]”).
113 § 19.230.055(4).
114 See Id.
115 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.033 (West 2012); see also UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
116 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.010(18) (West 2017) (“‘Money transmission’
means receiving money or its equivalent value (equivalent value includes virtual
currency). . . .” (emphasis added)).
117 Id.
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offerings in United States v. Zaslavskiy and SEC v. Blockvest, LLC.118 The
problems created by adopting such a broad definition cannot be
understated as leaving room for interpretation can lead to more
litigation. Moreover, a broad definition is all the more likely to deter
virtual currency businesses from participating in the licensing process
altogether.
This oversight in Washington’s regulatory scheme is unfortunate
considering that the state is home to three of the most innovative and
prosperous companies in the world: Amazon Microsoft, and Boeing.
Naturally, Washington would like to continue its growth as a technology
hub by taking a lead role in blockchain and virtual currency
development.119 Washington’s creation of a multi-state licensing system
is indeed a positive step for the industry. Its benefits, however, are
outweighed by the regulatory burdens imposed by the dual permissible
investment maintenance and surety bond requirements, as well as
definitional criteria lacking specificity.120
D. WYOMING: “THE DELAWARE OF DIGITAL ASSET LAW”121
Wyoming has earned the reputation as the most “crypto-friendly”
state by passing multiple laws centered on blockchain and virtual
currency innovation and development.122
Wyoming began by
exempting virtual currency businesses from registering under
Wyoming’s particularly onerous Money Transmitters Act.123 A few of
these laws are worth highlighting: the application of Uniform

118 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (seminal case creating an
analytical framework for determining what qualifies as a security); see also United States
v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17CR647(RJD), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156574, at *11–23 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
11, 2018) and SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
200773, at *12–22 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018). Both cases are recent examples of courts
applying the Howey test to virtual currency offerings.
119 Nat Levy, Washington Regulators Want to Turn Around State’s Bad Rep on
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, GEEKWIRE (July 6, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.geekwire.com/2018/washington-regulators-want-turn-around-statesbad-rep-blockchain-cryptocurrency/.
120 See Id.
121 Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, FORBES (Mar. 4,
2019, 7:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/04/what-dowyomings-new-blockchain-laws-mean/#554c5f4e5fde.
122 Barber, supra note 54.
123 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-104(a)(vi) (2019); See also WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-22105–121. Standing out among the burdensome licensing requirements are the
requirements that a business must have a minimum net worth of $25,000, maintenance
of a surety bond between $10,000–$500,000 upon application, and the maintenance of
a statutory trust “having an aggregate market value . . . not less than the aggregate face
amount of all outstanding payment instruments[.]”.
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Commercial Code (UCC) definitional criteria to virtual currencies and
provisions concerning digital asset custodial services, The Financial
Technology Sandbox Act, The Special Depository Institutions Act, and
the Wyoming Utility Token Act.
As previously mentioned, States such as Washington define virtual
currencies in an all-inclusive manner.124 In lieu of adopting such a
blanket definition, Wyoming’s lawmakers opted to apply Wyoming’s
UCC definitions to virtual currencies, creating three distinct asset
classifications according to a given virtual currency’s intended use and
purpose.125 The first class of digital assets, “digital consumer assets”
adopts the UCC definition of “general intangibles.”126 The second class,
“digital securities” adopts the UCC definition of “securities and
investment property.”127 The final class, “virtual currency” falls within
the UCC’s definition of “money.”128
Wyoming’s definitional approach is a flexible one: it acknowledges
the amorphous nature of virtual currencies, brings the myriad of
possible adaptations of virtual currencies under a coherent statutory
schema, and ultimately provides predictability for virtual currency
businesses, consumers, and investors. In contrast, Washington’s broad
approach treats all virtual currencies the same, and as such, developers
are boxed in to treating a digital asset as a digital form of money instead
of being able to adapt an offering for a specific purpose. Meanwhile,
Wyoming has given innovators in the Fintech space the opportunity to
expand existing businesses and develop new applications for virtual

124 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.010(18) (West 2017) (defining “money
transmission” as “receiving money or its equivalent value (equivalent value includes
virtual currency) to transmit, deliver, or instruct to be delivered to another location,
inside or outside the United States, by any means including but not limited to by wire,
facsimile, or electronic transfer. ‘Money transmission’ includes selling, issuing, or acting
as an intermediary for open loop prepaid access and payment instruments, but not
closed loop prepaid access.”).
125 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-102 (2015).
126 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(a)(i) (2019); § 34.1-9-102(a)(xlii) (defining “general
intangibles” as “any personal property . . . deposit accounts, documents, goods,
instruments, investment property . . . includ[ing] payment intangibles and software”).
127 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(a)(ii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-8-102(a)(xv) (2015)
(defining “Security” as “an obligation of an issuer or a share, participation, or other
interest in an issuer or in property or an enterprise of an issuer”); § 34.1-9-102(a)(xlix)
(defining “investment property” as “a security, whether certificated or uncertificated,
security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract or commodity account”).
128 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(a)(iii) (stating “virtual currency is intangible
personal property and shall be considered money, notwithstanding . . . [§] 34.1-1201(b)(xxiv)”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-1-201(b)(xxiv) (2015) (defining “Money” as “a
medium of exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government.”).
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currencies, all the while upholding their commitment to consumer
protection.
Beginning on January 1, 2020, under the Financial Technology
Sandbox Act,129 developers and entrepreneurs may apply to enter the so
called “sandbox,” and upon approval, may experiment with and develop
new blockchain and virtual currency business models, without fear of
being hamstrung by the state’s regulatory regime.130 The ingenuity of
the Fintech sandbox is its twenty-four month waiver period exempting
participants from adhering to certain statutes, regulations, and
reporting requirements that would ordinarily extend the timeline for an
entity bringing a product to market.131 The waiver does not offer
wholesale immunity—participants are still subject to civil suit, and
importantly, “[s]ubject to all criminal and consumer protection laws.”132
Upon approval, participants are required to submit at minimum a
$10,000 dollar consumer protection bond, which may be adjusted
upward or downward at any time to reflect the risk profile of a given
product or model.133
Wyoming’s legislature is also taking steps to revolutionize the
crypto landscape by melding the characteristically decentralized world
of virtual currencies with the security and legitimacy of centralized
financial institutions by passing into law the Special Purpose Depository
Institutions Act134 and the Digital Asset Custodial Services provision.135
The creation of these depository institutions fills a gap created by the
banks and financial institutions wary of extending their services to

129

See generally WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-29-101– 40-29-109.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-104(a), (d)-(f)(iii) (2020) (establishing the application
must include a criminal background check of the applicant(s), payment of a $500.00
dollar fee, and a business plan describing the nature of the innovative financial product
or service proposed.)
131 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-103(a) (2020) (stating “a person who makes an
innovative financial product or service available to consumers in the financial
technology sandbox may be granted a waiver of specified requirements imposed by
statute or rule, or portions thereof, if these statutes or rules do not currently permit the
product or service to be made available to consumers.”); § 40-29-102(vii) (“Sandbox
period’” means the period of time, initially not longer than twenty-four (24) months, in
which the commissioner or secretary has authorized an innovative financial product or
service to be made available to consumers[.]”)
132 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-103(b).
133 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-104(h).
134 See generally Special Purpose Depository Institutions Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-12101– 13-12-126.
135 See generally WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-104 (2020).
130
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blockchain and virtual currency businesses due to stigma and legality
concerns.136
Under the SPDI Act, Special Purpose Depository Institutions
(“SPDIs”) are prohibited from lending, and are not required to carry
FDIC insurance.137 The lending prohibition stands out because it gives
burgeoning virtual currency businesses the peace of mind that their
financial assets, especially in the vulnerable stages of early
development, will be safely held in confidence, instead of indirectly
serving as creditors for the bank’s other customers. The legislation
provides SPDIs immunity, through the elimination of the FDIC insurance
requirement, from a number of federal restrictions on providing
custodial services to blockchain and VC businesses.138 Concerns over
waiving traditional FDIC insurance requirements are mitigated by a
provision in the SPDI Act requiring all special purpose depository
institutions to maintain “unencumbered liquid assets valued at no less
than one hundred percent (100%) of its depository liabilities.”139
By requiring SPDIs to maintain encumbered liquid assets,
Wyoming shifted the burden of funding oversight mechanisms and
consumer protection funds from virtual currency enterprises to the
financial institutions themselves. Doing so eliminates the expenses
presented by programs such as Connecticut’s, where VC entities must
hold permissible investments equal to their outstanding obligations, or
the extensive surety bond requirements like those present in
Washington.140 As a result, VC entities in Wyoming can dedicate a
greater amount of capital to developing a product or business model
instead of being stymied financially by consumer protection regulations.
Wyoming VC companies also have a greater sense of legitimacy attached

136 See Paul Vigna, Lack of Banking Options a Big Problem for Crypto Businesses, WALL
ST. J. (May 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lack-of-banking-options-a-bigproblem-for-crypto-businesses-11558092600 (discussing that only a few major crypto
currency exchanges have cultivated relationships with banks, because banks are “wary
of the drug dealers and scammers attracted to the anonymity of cryptocurrency, [and]
shun many of the firms behind the electronic money”).
137 WYO. STAT. ANN. §13-12-103 (2020); § 13-2-103(a) (2020) (“All banks, except
special purpose depository institutions, shall obtain insurance of their deposits by the
United States and shall subscribe for insurance of deposit accounts by the federal
deposits insurance corporation (FDIC)).
138 Chad Richman, Wyoming’s “Crypto‐Bank” Charter, FENWICK & WEST LLP (May 23,
2019),
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Wyomings-Crypto-bankCharter.aspx.
139 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-12-105(a) (2019).
140 See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-603(b) (West 2017); see also WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 19.230.055 (West 2017).
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to their name, since businesses taking advantage of SPDIs are backed by
a legally sound and reputable financial institution.
In order for VC businesses to take advantage of SPDIs, prospective
businesses must demonstrate that adequate anti-money laundering
protocols, analogous to those required under federal law, are in place.141
Applicants must also furnish tangible proof that the business engages in
lawful activity.142
SF0125’s digital asset custodial services provision created a oneof-a-kind system placing unparalleled decision-making authority into
the hands of investors and allowing institutional investors to diversify
their clientele’s portfolios by enabling investments in digital assets.143
The provision grants banks the authority, pursuant to written
agreements with a customer, to enter into a bailment relationship in
which the customer maintains full ownership of their digital assets, and
can opt to either segregate VC from other assets or consent to the bank
conducting transactions with their VC assets.144 Importantly, under the
latter option, the bank must conduct such transactions in strict
conformity with the written instructions of the customer.145
This provision has an important upshot when considering the fact
that federal securities law and SEC regulations require registered
investment advisers to deposit client funds with a qualified custodian.146
Virtual currency investing is predominantly carried out by individual
investors on trading platforms such as Binance, Bitfinex and
Coinbase.147 Recently, more mainstream securities trading platforms—
like the mobile trading start-up Robinhood—now allow customers to
purchase and trade Bitcoin and other popular cryptocurrencies.148 The
limited variety of tradeable cryptocurrencies on Robinhood, however,
are unappealing to many crypto investors as these individuals
commonly purchase multiple virtual currencies as a hedge, or because

141

WYO. STAT. ANN. §13-12-104 (2020).
Id.
143 See Long, supra note 121.
144 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-104(d)–(e) (2020).
145 § 34-29-104(e).
146 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18b (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2010).
147 See
generally, Top Cryptocurrency Spot Exchanges, COINMARKETCAP
https://coinmarketcap.com/rankings/exchanges/ (last visited June 6, 2021).
148 See ROBINHOOD CRYPTO, https://robinhood.com/about/crypto (last visited Mar..17,
2021) (the mobile trading platform allows users to “[b]uy and sell Bitcoin, Ethereum,
Dogecoin, and other cryptocurrencies 24/7 and commission-free[.]”).
142
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of the investors’ interest in the penny stocks of the crypto world: “alt
coins”.149
Investing in virtual currencies requires a degree of sophistication
akin to the practice of stock picking; rather than throwing darts at a wall
of crypto offerings, many traders employ advanced charting and
technical analysis strategies.150 This requisite is especially true when
taking into account the high volatility of the virtual currency
marketplace.151 Because of the inherent time considerations, the
average investor entrusts wealth managers and institutional investors
with managing their funds on their behalf. Unfortunately, the average
investor looking to diversify their third-party managed investments is
not yet afforded the opportunity to incorporate digital assets into their
portfolios, with the exception of the few brokerage firms currently
offering investments in bitcoin futures.152 The SPDI Act now opens the
door for brokers looking to diversify their clients’ portfolios with
investments in digital assets, without fear of running afoul of SEC Rule
206(4)-2.153 Furthermore, customers will have freedom of choice to a
149 See ROBINHOOD CRYPTO, supra note 148; See generally, CB INSIGHTS, What are
Stablecoins?, (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/what-arestablecoins/#:~:text=In%20general%2C%20a%20stablecoin%20is,value%20of%20a
n%20underlying%20asset.&text=Many%20stablecoins%20are%20pegged%20at,can
%20be%20traded%20on%20exchanges (discussing “stablecoins, “virtual currencies
which are pegged to the value of gold, the US dollar, or other stable commodities or
currencies. Many crypto investors hedge their positions in more volatile virtual
currencies with investments in stablecoins); and Daniel Van Boom, Beyond Bitcoin:
Inside the insane world of altcoin cryptocurrencies, CNET, (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.cnet.com/features/beyond-bitcoin-the-wild-world-of-altcoincryptocurrency-trading/ (providing background on alt coins and explaining the
rampant speculation in such offerings by retail investors).
150 See
generally
James
Chen,
Stock
Pick,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stockpick.asp (last updated Dec. 23, 2020)
(Stock picking is the process employed by traders and investors where a “systematic
form of analysis [is used] to conclude that a particular stock will make a good
investment[.]”);
and
see
GEMINI,
Technical
Analysis
and
Crypto,
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/technical-analysis-bitcoin-and-crypto
(last
updated May 27, 2021).
151 See
generally
YAHOO
FINANCE,
Most
Volatile
Cryptos,
https://finance.yahoo.com/u/yahoo-finance/watchlists/crypto-volatility-high/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021).
152 See
generally
TD
AMERITRADE,
Bitcoin
Futures,
https://www.tdameritrade.com/investment-products/futures-trading/bitcoinfutures.page (last visited Mar. 17 2021); Cf. CHARLES SCHWAB, Bitcoin: Does It Have a Place
in Your Portfolio?, https://www.schwabassetmanagement.com/content/bitcoin-doesit-have-place-your-portfolio (Apr.1, 2021).
153 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-12-101–13-12-126. SEC Rule 206(4)-2 states that it is a
“fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act, practice, or course of business” for a
registered investment advisor to maintain custody of client funds unless a “qualified
custodian maintains those funds and securities[.]” 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2(a)(1) (2010).
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degree rarely seen in fiduciary investor-manager relationships due to
the specific written consent requirements proscribed under the SPDI
Act.154
The Utility Token Act (UTA) concerns virtual currencies created
solely for consumptive purposes.155 “Consumptive purposes” means
that the given virtual currency may only be exchanged for a specifically
proscribed good or service; a holder of a utility token purchases the
rights to whatever that token is being sold for.156 As discussed earlier,
the laws in Connecticut and Washington do not adequately facilitate the
growth of utility token centric business models because of the broad
definitional criteria and onerous licensing requirements present within
those statutes.157 Virtual currencies subject to registration under
different subsections of the Financial Technology Sandbox Act may not
masquerade as a utility token issuer to take advantage of the UTA’s
exemptions from state securities and money transmitter registration.158
Exemption from registration requires utility token developers and
sellers to abide by a set of stringent rules: utility tokens may not be
marketed as a financial investment, cannot be re-sold by the buyer until
the token can be used for its intended purpose, and the seller of the
token must take reasonable steps to ensure that buyers are not
purchasing a utility token as a financial investment.159
One may ask what value utility tokens serve when their value is
pegged to a particular service or good, rather than having the potential
to appreciate in value like a traditional asset. But utility tokens provide
a different kind of benefit for businesses and consumers alike because
of their potential to generate interest in a particular good or service; a
streamlined method of capital formation in the form of crowd sourcing
investments in a product or business model.160 Utility tokens also
provides businesses with an accurate tool for tracking inventories and
154

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-104(e) (2020).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-106 (2019) (“‘Consumptive’ means a circumstance
when a token is exchangeable for, or provided for receipt of, services, software, content
or real or tangible personal property, including rights of access to services, content or
real or tangible personal property[.]”).
156 Id.
157 See supra Part III.
158 John Biggs, Wyoming works to make some crypto tokens exempt from regulation,
TECHCRUNCH, (Mar. 7, 2018, 1:12 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/07/wyomingworks-to-make-some-crypto-tokens-exempt-from-regulation/.
159 See § 34-29-106(a) – (f).
160 See generally David Mack, Token Based Funding, DEFI PRIME (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://defiprime.com/token-based-funding; Gigi Levy-Weiss, The Future of
Fundraising? What we Need to Fix About Token Investing, NFX
https://www.nfx.com/post/token-investing/ (last visited June 5, 2021).
155
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projecting expenditures.161 As such, creating a legal framework
centered on utility tokens is a practical way to encourage
entrepreneurial and small business inclusion into Wyoming’s virtual
currency industry, and encourages consumers to become directly
involved in the process of propping up businesses within their
community.
Bearing this in mind, it is important to acknowledge the prevailing
views amongst regulators as it pertains to initial coin offerings (ICOs).
The federal government’s crackdown on virtual currencies stems
largely from fraudulent initial coin offerings (ICOs) premised on
launching a unique virtual currency or business offering.162 The
difficulty presented by ICOs is that the underlying business or offering
is not subject to vetting through an application, licensing, or registration
regime that a publicly offered company would normally be subjected
to.163 Instead, in the virtual currency world, all that is needed is a
website and an idea. Consequently, ICOs are commonly regarded as just
another Ponzi scheme or a new kind of digitized snake oil.164
This is where the true value of Wyoming’s Utility Token Act comes
into play: by virtue of creating barriers to entry into the state’s economy,
Wyoming’s regulatory enforcement arm can now ensure that utility
token issuers are legitimate and in good standing. The vetting process
created by the Utility Token Act may now have the downstream effect of
boosting consumer and investor confidence, which in turn creates an
environment where burgeoning small businesses and entrepreneurs
can pursue their unique business models with greater ease.

161 The blockchain technology underlying utility tokens can allow businesses to more
efficiently manage supply chain and inventory. Sharon Edelson, Blockchain Could
Transform Retail, From Supply Chain and Inventory Management to Product Provenance,
FORBES
(May
3,
2021,
11:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sharonedelson/2021/05/03/esg-investing-inblockchain-and-cryptocurrency-decoded/?sh=163f49521c2f.
162 See generally, Kate Rooney, In Bigger Crackdown of Crypto Abuses, SEC Goes After
Unregistered
Coin
Offerings,
CNBC
(Nov.
19,
2018,
3:18
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/16/in-crackdown-of-crypto-sec-goes-afterunregistered-coin-offerings.html.
163 See Connor Sephton, Five big problems with initial coin offerings – and how to avoid
them, CURRENCY.COM (Nov. 15, 2019, 7:35 PM), https://currency.com/five-big-problemswith-initial-coin-offerings-and-how-to-avoid-them.
164 Ben Dickson, Can You Trust Crypto‐Token Crowdfunding?, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 12,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/12/can-you-trust-crypto-tokencrowdfunding/.
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E. COLORADO: CRYPTO ECONOMIC SYSTEMS HUB
Along with Wyoming, Colorado is the only other state
implementing a virtual currency regulatory scheme that attempts to
facilitate the assimilation of virtual currency businesses within their
borders without imposing redundant registration requirements.165 The
primary goal underlying the Colorado Digital Token Act (SB 19-023)166
is to “enable Colorado businesses that use cryptoeconomic systems to
obtain growth capital to help grown and expand their businesses . . . and
helping make Colorado a hub for companies that are building new forms
of decentralized ‘Web 3.0’ platforms and applications.”167 Colorado’s
Digital Token Act embraces a definition of digital tokens created for
consumptive purposes similar to the Wyoming Utility Token Act: it
seeks to implement a system in which businesses may utilize
“[c]rowdfunding consumer goods platforms [to] provide a means for
companies and entrepreneurs to acquire growth capital and customers
by preselling the right to receive consumer goods before the goods are
ready to be sold or used[.]”168 The Act also created two exemptions from
the Colorado Securities Act (CSA),169 the issuer exemption, and the
licensing exemption.170
In 2016, Colorado passed into law the Colorado Crowdfunding Act
with the hopes of courting start-up companies and accelerating small
business growth in the state.171 While the Crowdfunding Act applies
specifically to securities-issuing companies, it nonetheless provided the
impetus for the crowdfunding goals underlying Colorado’s Digital Token
Act. The Crowdfunding Act acknowledges the obstacles presented by
the CSA’s expensive and often confusing registration requirements as
well as the restrictions placed on crowdfunding by the CSA.172
Importantly, when crafting the Digital Token Act, lawmakers already
had at their disposal the legislative findings and underlying policy
initiative to craft a niche crowdfunding application. The Digital Token
Act aptly embraced the state’s crowdfunding goals by allowing small
165

See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-308.7(c) West (2019).
§ 11-51-308.7.
167 § 11-51-308.7(c).
168 § 11-51-308.7(2)(a)(V). “Crowdfunding” refers to the process of “raising money
online through small contributions from a large number of investors” which allows
small companies to access the necessary capital for starting or expanding a business. §
11-51-308.5(2)(b)(II)-(III).
169 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-301 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-302
(West 2018).
170 § 11-51-308.7(3)(a); § 11-51-308.7(3)(b).
171 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-308.5 (West 2016).
172 See § 11-51-308.5(2)(b)(I)-(II).
166
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companies to raise capital through the issuance of virtual currencies
created for consumptive purposes, which could later be exchanged for a
consumer good pegged to the value of the issued consumptive token.
Under the Digital Token Act, ambitious entrepreneur’s with limited
capital and sparse credit history, now have access to a cheaper and less
redundant regulatory scheme, which in turn allows these entrepreneurs
to crowdfund through the issuance of a consumptive digital token. By
way of example, take Jonathan, a twenty-three year old entrepreneur
who wants to start a clothing line consisting of three different
sweatshirt designs. Jonathan does not have the finances or credit
worthiness necessary to procure the necessary materials and
equipment to begin producing his sweatshirts.
In theory, the Digital Token Act would enable Jonathan to create a
digital token which could be offered to consumers who could later
exchange those tokens for sweatshirts. Here, the innovation is that
creating such a token is far cheaper than creating the supply for the
product (i.e. the sweatshirts) prior to having any demand. Now
Jonathan can sell the token which will: 1) provide the entrepreneur with
the necessary capital to make his sweatshirts, and 2) give the
entrepreneur an accurate picture of his sweatshirt production needs.
The Digital Token Act could also have a profound effect on another
burgeoning area in Colorado: the industry.
The Digital Token Act will likely play a significant role in facilitating
the continued growth of Colorado’s burgeoning recreational cannabis
industry, as many companies are beginning to utilize blockchain
technology to “monitor[] the growth and shipping of cannabis, referred
to in the industry as ‘seed-to-sale-tracking.’”173 Cannabis companies
shifting to immutable ledger tracking systems now have the opportunity
of using the same ledger technology as a bedrock for a consumptive
token that could seamlessly rest upon the same technology already in
use for other business functions, such as the crowd funding example
discussed above.
In addition to aiding business formation, the Digital Token Act also
protects those seeking to utilize consumptive tokens by exempting
issuers of consumptive tokens from Colorado’s stringent securities
registration and broker-dealer/investment advisor regulatory and
licensure schemes. 174 The Colorado Securities Act (CSA) prohibits
individuals from selling investment securities without properly filing
173

Chris Chafin, Why Weed Companies Are Embracing Blockchain, ROLLING STONE (Dec.
10, 2018, 4:23 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/weedcompanies-blockchain-cryptocurrencies-760151/.
174 See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-301 (West 2018).
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with the state’s securities commissioner.175
The securities
commissioner has wide discretion in the registration process by virtue
of setting the registration fee and having the power to hold proceeds
from a securities sale in escrow until a determined threshold amount of
the security is sold.176 Another nuance of the issuer exemption that sets
Colorado’s Token Act apart from Wyoming is the required buyer
acknowledgement.177 Under the Colorado Act, the buyer of a
consumptive token must take responsibility for their purchase, thus
indirectly shielding the issuer of that token.178 On the other hand,
Wyoming’s Utility Token Act forces the issuer to properly vet the sale of
a consumptive token by taking “reasonable precautions” to ensure
consumptive tokens are not being purchased as a speculative vehicle,
and as such, issuers may be liable for a buyer’s wrongful purchase.179
The CSA requires broker-dealers and investment advisers to
properly register with the state’s securities commissioner.180 In
addition to filing notice with the state, individuals registering must pay
an initial and annual licensing fee.181 Absent exemption, virtual
currency developers in Colorado seeking to comply with state law risk
running afoul of federal securities law because Colorado’s licensing
process tracks federal requirements under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.182
The licensing exemption allows an issuer of consumptive tokens to
bypass licensing under the CSA so long as the issuer is engaged in the
sale of consumptive tokens, properly files a notice of intent with the
state securities commissioner, and provides reasonable oversight to
ensure the issued token is properly used for consumptive purposes.183
Interestingly, the licensing exemption contains a provision allowing
175

Id.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-707(3)(a) (vesting power to set registration fee),
and see § 11-51-302(5) (2018) (vesting escrow discretion).
177 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-308.7(3)(a)(V)(C) (West 2019) (“The initial
buyer provides a knowing and clear acknowledgement that the initial buyer is
purchasing the digital token with the primary intent to use the digital token for a
consumptive purpose and not for a speculative or investment purpose.”), with WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 34-29-106(b)(iii)(D) (2019) (“The developer or seller takes other reasonable
precautions to prevent an initial buyer from purchasing the token as a financial
investment.”).
178 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-308.7(3)(a)(V)(C).
179 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-106(b)(iii)(D).
180 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-401(1)-(4) (1999).
181 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-404 (2015).
182 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-402(1)(a) (exempting broker-dealer’s
registered under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from state registration requirements),
with 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a)-(b) (2015).
183 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-308.7(3)(b) (2019).
176
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virtual currencies developed in Colorado, other states, and foreign
jurisdictions to enter into Colorado’s market, or for Colorado-based
issuers to enter into domestic and foreign jurisdictions.184 This is made
possible through power granted to the Securities Commissioner
allowing that individual to enter into agreements with regulators from
other states, the federal government, or regulators from foreign
jurisdictions.185
By allowing such agreements, Colorado’s legislature legitimized a
long-term approach that will allow Colorado to assert its role as a crypto
economic systems hub. Now, as other jurisdictions seek to incorporate
virtual currencies into their financial markets, Colorado will be able to
insert its digital asset products into other jurisdictions, so long as
regulators from different jurisdictions enter into agreements with one
another. At the same time, Colorado can bolster its crypto economy by
having a say in the kinds of virtual currencies entering into their market.
Colorado’s Digital Token Act does not go as far as Wyoming’s multifaceted approach, but it is undoubtedly a step in a more innovative
direction. Allowing a market for consumptive purpose utility tokens
with the overall vision of facilitating a growing entrepreneurial and
start-up culture is a coherent model that other states may seek to
emulate. This is especially true for those states looking to innovate their
economies and grow their financial technology sectors.

PART IV. THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE COIN
Change at the federal level is likely to remain stagnant for the
coming years considering Congress’s demonstrated lack of knowledge
when it comes to rudimentary technological concepts.186 Until the
knowledge gap shrinks, the federal stance will remain grounded in an
enforcement paradigm. As such, states will be responsible for driving
legislative initiatives in the cryptocurrency and blockchain industries.
In this context, states will always have the overarching goal of
protecting their constituents from fraudulent virtual currency offerings.
As we have seen up until this point, this is not a zero-sum game; states
do not have to choose between innovation and stifling regulation in the

184

§ 11-51-308.7(3)(d).
Id.
186 See, e.g., Anna Hensel, Congress Lacks Tech Knowledge to Properly Question Google
CEO
Sundar
Pichai,
VENTUREBEAT
(Dec.
11,
2018),
https://venturebeat.com/2018/12/11/congress-lacks-tech-knowledge-to-properlyquestion-google-ceo-sundar-pichai/.
185
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name of consumer protection, where only a miniscule amount of VC
enterprises can satisfy licensing and registration requirements.
As Wyoming and Colorado have demonstrated, crypto friendly
regulatory schemes are achievable through a balancing of consumer
protection measures and provisions encouraging existing and aspiring
virtual currency enterprises to participate in their local economies.
Notwithstanding, the difficulties in achieving this balance stem largely
from nuances in defining virtual currencies, as well as a failure to
appreciate why businesses and consumers gravitate towards these
currencies in the first place. The explosion in popularity stems largely
from the simultaneous growing distrust in mainstream financial
institutions and the increasing public awareness of data privacy.187
Meanwhile, the more investment-minded recognize an opportunity to
prop up a new kind of asset class, which, depending on the design and
purpose of the digital asset, can be traded in currency, securities, or
commodities markets.
From a business perspective, entrepreneurs and the libertarianminded have recognized an opportunity to tap into these growing
consumer sentiments, as well as the chance to launch business
platforms that would not have been feasible through the traditional
models of business planning and development.188 Regardless of the
motivations, technological change will continue to shape the American
business landscape and consumer preferences. It is up to the states
whether to harness the power of these changes or to try to meld the
ever-shifting landscape to existing regulatory frameworks.
On the “right side of the coin” are the Wyoming and Colorado
approaches. These frameworks acknowledge the tidal change in
technology and seek to embrace the potential economic windfall that
virtual currency businesses and related technologies can bring into
their borders. States like Wyoming have accepted, and wholeheartedly
embraced, the reality the reality that the inherently amorphous nature
of crypto currencies is best served by a malleable framework and broad
definitional criteria that gives virtual currency developers the power to
conform their business model to a digital asset class that appropriately

187

See Kate Rooney, After The Crisis, a New Generation Puts Its Trust in Tech Over
Traditional
Banks,
CNBC
(Sept.
14,
2018,
2:23
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/a-new-generation-puts-its-trust-in-tech-overtraditional-banks.html; see also Louis Menand, Why Do We Care So Much About Privacy?,
(Jun. 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-wecare-so-much-about-privacy.
188 See Andrey Sergeenkov, DeFi is the New Lemonade Stand, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 16,
2021), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/366444.
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serves their desired purpose.189 In doing so, the likelihood of litigation
over whether a digital asset complies with a specific statutory definition
is reduced because VC developers and issuers are opting-in to an asset
class, rather than having the class imposed upon their business.190
To truly catalyze the assimilation of virtual currencies into the
economic lexicon, states would be well served to follow in Wyoming’s
path. Recognizing the role that traditional financial institutions can play
in the growth of the virtual currency industry dampens the stigma
associated with such technologies while buttressing consumer
protection goals and economic innovation.191 Statutory devices
permitting the licensing of Special Purpose Depository Institutions
(SPDIs), and giving financial institutions the option to serve as qualified
custodians gives consumers and VC businesses the peace of mind that
their assets will be well protected and fosters an environment of trust
that could shift virtual currencies from being a niche device, to
something that the average consumer would be interested in taking
advantage of.
In all likelihood, state legislators and regulators will remain
dubious of enacting wholesale virtual currency schemes. What is more
likely is the embrace of utility tokens, or novel applications such as
California’s proposed bill authorizing cannabis businesses to pay state
and local taxes via stablecoins.192 Consumptive purpose tokens can
drive the growth of small business and entrepreneurial activity within
their borders.193 Importantly, states can take this action regardless of
their existing industries, demographics, and access to natural resources.
Technology-based businesses can generally exist in all environments
and may be interwoven into existing marketplaces or may diversify
state economies that have long relied on decaying industries like
manufacturing and coal mining.194

189

See generally WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-102 (2019).
See generally United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17CR647(RJD), 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis
156574, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018); and SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287GPB(BLM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200773, *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018).
191 See Vigna, supra note 136 (discussing the hesitancy of banks to embrace
cryptocurrencies due to their prevelant association with money laundering and other
illicit activities).
192 See supra note 70.
193 Karen Graham, Sizing up the financially underserved market FINTECH FUTURES (Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.fintechfutures.com/2020/04/sizing-up-the-financiallyunderserved-market/.
194 See, e.g., Kris Maher, In Pro‐Trump West Virginia Coal Country, the Jobs Keep
Leaving, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-pro-trump-westvirginia-coal-country-the-jobs-keep-leaving-11572269967.
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Allowing existing and aspiring businesses to utilize consumptive
tokens to fundraise and streamline business activities defies the
normative practices which have characteristically served the wealthy.
While members of the upper class more readily obtain capital through
traditional lending, individuals of lesser privilege now have the
opportunity to access capital through grassroots modicums. This trend
has the potential to serve as a tool in rejuvenating the economies of
historically impoverished and financially-underserved areas of the
country.195 In sum, permitting the development of technologically
efficient devices such as consumptive tokens that bring with them the
benefits of immutable ledger technology may be the answer to the
economic stagnancy taking hold over different regions of the United
States.

Part V. Conclusion
This comment advances the adoption of more “cypto-friendly”
regulatory schemes like those in force in Wyoming and Colorado. First,
this comment grappled with the varying regulatory approaches of the
SEC and FinCEN, highlighting the federal government’s enforcementbased paradigm, and how differing definitional criteria amongst federal
agencies shapes their respective regulatory approaches. Next, this
comment analyzed the legislative schemes enacted in several different
states, with a focus on emphasizing coherently defining digital assets
and the potential deleterious effects of imposing traditional money
transmitter licensing requirements such as permissible investment
holdings and surety bond requirements on virtual currency businesses.
While these requirements exist to protect consumers, states like
Wyoming and Colorado have been able to advance a framework that
adequately balances the interests in consumer protection while
injecting new life into their local economies. Regardless of approach, it
is clear that while the federal government seeks to stamp out fraud and
the use of virtual currencies for illicit purposes, state legislatures and
regulators need not choose between protecting its consumers and
taking advantage of the potential economic windfall associated with
virtual currencies and related technologies.

195 See generally Univ. of Mich., New index ranks America’s 100 most disadvantaged
communities, (Jan. 30, 2020), https://poverty.umich.edu/2020/01/30/new-indexranks-americas-100-most-disadvantaged-communities/.

